Lingyi Wei

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New Institutional Economics and Trade

From the 1970s, a group of economists set out to explain institutions with the tools of mainstream economics: rational choice, transaction costs, and game theory. Applied to trade, their work asked how long-distance exchange became possible without a world government to enforce contracts, how institutions shape comparative advantage, and how trade itself changed institutions, sometimes for better and sometimes catastrophically for worse.

In this topic
  1. Transaction costs and the extent of the market
  2. How did long-distance trade become possible?
  3. Institutions as a source of comparative advantage
  4. Atlantic trade and the rise of Europe
  5. The slave trades and Africa
  6. Trade or institutions?
  7. Readings

1. Transaction costs and the extent of the market

Classical trade theory assumed that, once goods could be transported, exchange was easy: buyers and sellers would find each other, agree on terms, and keep their promises. Ronald Coase (1937) pointed out that using the market has costs: finding partners, negotiating, writing contracts, and enforcing them. Douglass North, in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990), made these transaction costs the center of economic history. Institutions, which North defined as “the rules of the game in a society,” formal (laws, constitutions, property rights) and informal (customs, norms, codes of conduct), determine how costly it is to transact. Where institutions are poor, exchange is limited to people who know and trust each other, and Smith’s division of labor (Topic 2) is limited not only by the extent of the market but by the reach of trust and enforcement.

Long-distance trade is the hardest case. The parties are far apart, payment and delivery are separated in time, and no single authority can enforce a contract between merchants of different countries. North received the Nobel Prize in 1993, with Robert Fogel, for renewing economic history with economic theory.

2. How did long-distance trade become possible?

Avner Greif used game theory to study the institutions that supported trade in the medieval Mediterranean:

Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast (1990) analyzed the private judges at the Champagne fairs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, who kept records of merchants’ conduct and resolved disputes under the “law merchant.” These studies showed that markets rest on institutions, many of them private, and that the form those institutions take affects how far trade can grow.

3. Institutions as a source of comparative advantage

If contracts are easier to enforce in some countries than others, then industries that depend heavily on contracts will tend to locate in countries with good contract enforcement. Nathan Nunn (2007) measured, for each industry, how much of its inputs are relationship-specific: customized parts that cannot easily be sold to another buyer, so that the supplier is vulnerable if the buyer reneges. Automobiles and aircraft need many such inputs; flour milling and petroleum refining need few. Nunn found that countries with better contract enforcement export relatively more in industries that rely on relationship-specific inputs. By his estimates, institutions explain as much of the pattern of trade as physical capital and skilled labor combined.

Andrei Levchenko (2007) reached a similar conclusion, and other studies have found that financial development, labor-market institutions, and the quality of courts shape comparative advantage in the same way. Institutions become a factor of production, like capital or skilled labor in the Heckscher–Ohlin model (Topic 6). The implication cuts both ways: countries with weak institutions are pushed toward simple, low-contract industries, and improving institutions can change what a country exports.

4. Atlantic trade and the rise of Europe

Trade can also change institutions. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2005) noted that Western Europe’s divergence from the rest of the world after 1500 was driven largely by countries with access to the Atlantic, such as Britain and the Netherlands, and by Atlantic port cities. They argued that the profits of Atlantic trade enriched merchant groups outside the royal circle, and these groups then demanded and won limits on the power of the crown, as in the Dutch Revolt and the English Glorious Revolution of 1688. Secure property rights followed, laying the basis for later growth. Where the monarchy was already strong and controlled the trade itself, as in Spain and Portugal, Atlantic trade instead strengthened the crown and did not produce the same institutional change. Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989) had argued that the Glorious Revolution made the English state’s commitment to respect property credible.

5. The slave trades and Africa

For Africa, trade had devastating institutional effects. Between 1400 and 1900, about 12 million people were taken across the Atlantic, and millions more were exported across the Sahara, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Nathan Nunn (2008) showed that the African regions from which the most slaves were taken are the poorest today. Because slaves were often captured by neighbors, kin, and even family members, the trades undermined trust, weakened states, and fragmented societies. Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon (2011) found that people from ethnic groups more heavily exposed to the slave trades trust their neighbors, relatives, and local governments less today. These findings resonate with the arguments of Walter Rodney (Topic 23), though they are reached by different methods.

6. Trade or institutions?

Does trade cause growth, or do good institutions cause both trade and growth? Jeffrey Frankel and David Romer (1999) used geography to isolate the part of trade that is not caused by income and found that trade raises income. Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi (2004) ran a “horse race” among geography, trade, and institutions and concluded that “institutions rule”: once the quality of institutions is controlled for, trade has little direct effect on income. The debate remains open, partly because trade, institutions, and income influence each other.

MechanismDirectionExample
Institutions enable tradeInstitutions → tradeMerchant coalitions, the law merchant, courts
Institutions shape comparative advantageInstitutions → pattern of tradeContract enforcement and relationship-specific industries
Trade strengthens good institutionsTrade → institutionsAtlantic merchants and limits on the crown
Trade destroys institutionsTrade → institutionsThe slave trades and the erosion of trust

Critics from the old institutionalist tradition (Topic 13) and from political economy argue that new institutional economics treats institutions too narrowly, as efficient solutions to problems of exchange, and pays too little attention to power. Which institutions emerge, they argue, depends on who has the power to shape them, a point Acemoglu and Robinson themselves increasingly emphasize.

Question to think about: Does trade build good institutions, or do good institutions make trade beneficial?

7. Readings

Core reading

Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990), chapter 1.

Nathan Nunn, “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2007), introduction.

Companion reading

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review (2005).

Nathan Nunn, “The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2008).

← Back to Topic 15 in the course outline