中文Resources › Theories of International Trade › Topic 16
Rodrik’s Globalization Trilemma
Dani Rodrik is a mainstream trade economist who has spent three decades warning his profession that it underrated the political costs of deep economic integration. His trilemma, which says that a country cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national sovereignty all at once, is one of the most widely used frameworks for understanding the backlash against globalization.
1. Has globalization gone too far?
In 1997, at the height of enthusiasm for globalization, Rodrik published a short book with a provocative title, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? He accepted that trade raises national income, but identified three sources of tension that economists tended to ignore:
- Bargaining power. When firms can move production abroad, or credibly threaten to, workers become easier to replace. Labor’s bargaining power falls, and workers bear more of the cost of improving working conditions and benefits.
- Conflicting social norms. Trade with countries that have very different labor, environmental, or social standards can undermine domestic norms and arrangements that people regard as legitimate, as in disputes over child labor or the ability to strike.
- Social insurance. Openness increases economic insecurity, so it raises the demand for social insurance at the very time that capital mobility makes it harder for governments to tax capital to pay for it.
Rodrik warned that if these tensions were ignored, the social consensus in favor of open markets could break down, as it had in the 1930s.
2. Open economies and big governments
In a 1998 article, “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?”, Rodrik documented a striking pattern: across countries, those more exposed to trade tend to have larger governments. Small, open European economies such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria had some of the largest welfare states in the world. His explanation was that governments in open economies provide social insurance against the risks of external shocks. This is the compensation hypothesis, and it fits the bargain that Ruggie called embedded liberalism (Topic 14): citizens accept openness because the state protects them from its worst effects.
3. The political trilemma
In The Globalization Paradox (2011), Rodrik generalized the argument as a trilemma. Of three things, a country can have at most two at once:
- Hyperglobalization: deep economic integration, in which national differences in regulation, taxes, and standards are removed so that markets operate across borders as within them.
- The nation-state: national sovereignty, with policy made by and for the national community.
- Democratic politics: policy that responds to the preferences of citizens, including demands for social protection.
Click two corners of the triangle to see the world they make possible.
Pick two
4. From shallow to deep integration
Rodrik’s argument rests on a distinction between two kinds of trade agreement. The GATT era (1947–94) was one of shallow integration: countries cut tariffs on manufactured goods but kept wide latitude over agriculture, services, investment, capital flows, and domestic regulation. Since the 1990s, agreements have pursued deep integration, reaching into intellectual property, health and safety standards, investment rules with their own dispute courts, subsidies, and financial regulation. The gains from removing the remaining tariffs are small, Rodrik notes, because tariffs are already low. The new rules mainly redistribute, often toward capital and large firms, while constraining democratic choices at home.
Financial globalization was, in his view, the clearest case of hyperglobalization outrunning its political foundations. Free capital movement exposed countries to sudden stops and crises, from Mexico (1994–95) and East Asia (1997–98) to Argentina (2001) and the euro area after 2010, without the global institutions that might manage them.
5. A smarter globalization
Rodrik’s own preference is the Bretton Woods corner, updated for the twenty-first century. Among the principles he proposed for a “sane” globalization are these:
- Markets must be embedded in systems of governance; there is no market without rules, and the rules are mostly national.
- Democratic governance and political communities are organized largely within nation-states, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
- Countries have the right to protect their own social arrangements, regulations, and institutions, and should not impose theirs on others.
- The purpose of international economic arrangements is to set traffic rules for managing the interface between national institutions, not to override them.
- Non-democratic countries cannot count on the same rights and privileges in the international economic order as democracies.
In practice, this would allow countries to use safeguards when trade threatens domestic norms, restrict capital flows, and pursue industrial policies, within agreed limits.
6. Critics and the backlash
Critics have raised several objections. Free traders argue that Rodrik overstates the constraints that trade agreements impose and understates the protectionist risks of loosening them. Some political scientists treat the trilemma as a spectrum of trade-offs rather than a strict impossibility. Supporters of supranational governance point to the European Union as an imperfect attempt at the global-federalism corner, while critics on the left argue that the nation-state is too weak to tame global capital, which requires international labor and social standards.
Events since 2016, including Brexit, the U.S.–China tariff war, and the return of industrial policy (Topic 12), have been widely read as the political reaction Rodrik predicted. Whether the resulting order will look more like his smart globalization or like the fragmented, protectionist world of the 1930s is an open question.
7. Readings
Core reading
Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (2011), chapters 9 and 12.
Companion reading
Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (1997), chapter 1.
Dani Rodrik, “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy (1998).