Lingyi Wei

中文Resources › History of Economic Thought › Topic 19

The Developmentalist Tradition and Globalization

From Alexander Hamilton to the East Asian “miracle” and the rise of China, a long tradition has argued that late-developing countries cannot catch up by leaving everything to the market. The state must build industries, protect them while they learn, and manage the country’s place in the world economy. This topic follows that tradition and its rival, the case for free trade, into today’s debates about globalization.

In this topic
  1. Hamilton, List, and catching up
  2. The infant-industry argument (interactive)
  3. Postwar development and import substitution
  4. The East Asian developmental state
  5. The Washington Consensus and its critics
  6. China
  7. Globalization and its discontents

1. Hamilton, List, and catching up

Adam Smith and David Ricardo argued that free trade benefits every country (Topics 2 and 4). The first serious challenge came from a newly independent country. In his Report on Manufactures (1791), Alexander Hamilton, the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, argued that young American industries could not compete with established British ones and needed protection and subsidies until they could. The United States became one of the most protectionist economies in the world in the nineteenth century, with average tariffs on manufactured imports of 40–50 percent for long periods after the Civil War.

The German economist Friedrich List, who had lived in the United States, made the argument systematic in The National System of Political Economy (1841). He accused Britain of preaching free trade only after it had used protection to become the workshop of the world:

It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him.Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (1841; English translation 1885)

List distinguished the wealth of a nation from its productive powers: its skills, industries, institutions, and infrastructure. A country might accept higher prices for a while to build up those powers, as an investment in the future. His ideas shaped Germany’s customs union and tariffs, the German historical school (Topic 10), and later Meiji Japan.

2. The infant-industry argument

The logic of “infant industries” rests on learning by doing: costs fall as a country accumulates experience in making something. A new producer starts with higher costs than established foreign rivals and may never get the chance to learn unless it is protected for a time. The argument is accepted even by many free-trade economists in principle; the debate is over whether governments can pick the right industries and withdraw protection once it has served its purpose.

Protecting an infant industry

Unit cost = starting cost × (cumulative output ÷ first-year output)−b, where 2−b = 1 − learning rate. Output grows 26% a year. The tariff must cover the gap between domestic cost and the import price until the gap closes.

3. Postwar development and import substitution

After 1945, newly independent countries took up the developmentalist case. The development economists of the golden age, Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Hirschman, and Lewis, argued for planned industrialization, and Raúl Prebisch’s Economic Commission for Latin America made import-substituting industrialization the strategy of much of Latin America, India, and Africa (Topics 13 and 20). Behind high tariffs, these countries built steel, cars, chemicals, and consumer goods. Growth was often rapid in the 1950s and 1960s, but many protected industries remained inefficient, exports stagnated, and foreign debt grew, setting the stage for the debt crisis of the 1980s.

4. The East Asian developmental state

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan grew faster than any economies in history between the 1950s and 1990s. Free-market economists first read this as a triumph of export orientation and open markets. A group of political economists showed that the state had been at the center of it:

The difference from Latin American import substitution, these authors argued, lay in discipline: protection and subsidies were conditional on firms learning to compete in export markets, and were withdrawn from those that failed. The World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle (1993) acknowledged a role for the state while minimizing it, which itself became the subject of debate.

5. The Washington Consensus and its critics

In the 1980s and 1990s, the debt crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union shifted policy in the opposite direction. John Williamson (1989) summarized the ten policies that the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury were urging on developing countries as the Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline, trade and financial liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and secure property rights (Topic 14). Results were disappointing in much of Latin America, Africa, and the former Soviet Union.

Ha-Joon Chang’s Kicking Away the Ladder (2002), taking its title from List, documented that Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, and Korea had all used infant-industry protection, subsidies, and state-owned enterprises when they were developing, and that institutions such as democracy, independent central banks, and strong patent laws mostly came after they grew rich. Rich countries, he argued, were recommending policies and institutions they had not used themselves.

6. China

China’s reforms after 1978 combined markets with a strong state: gradual price liberalization, township and village enterprises, special economic zones open to foreign investment, a managed exchange rate, state control of banking, and large public investment. From 1980 to 2010 output grew around 10 percent a year, and hundreds of millions of people left poverty. Economists still debate how to classify the result: as a developmental state on the East Asian model, as “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” or as a new form of state capitalism. China’s rise made the developmentalist debate central again, and its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 transformed world trade.

7. Globalization and its discontents

From the 1990s to 2008, world trade grew much faster than world output, and production was split across global value chains. Since 2008, that growth has stalled. Several lines of work explain the backlash:

Discussion: The developmentalists say that rich countries kicked away the ladder; free-traders say that protection mostly protects inefficiency. Which cases support each side, and what made the difference?

Readings

Core reading

Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (2002), ch. 2.

Chang, Economics: The User’s Guide, ch. 4 (the Developmentalist tradition).

Companion reading

Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (1989), ch. 1.

Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox (2011), ch. 9.

Zeihan, The End of the World Is Just the Beginning (2022), selections.

Yueh, What Would the Great Economists Do?, epilogue (the future of globalization).

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