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Environmental Economics
Neoclassical economics applied to nature: pollution and resource depletion are market failures, and the right prices, property rights, or permits can correct them. This topic follows the field from Pigou to carbon pricing and the debate over discounting the future.
1. What environmental economics is
Environmental economics is neoclassical applied microeconomics. It treats pollution and the depletion of natural resources as market failures: costs that fall on people who are not party to a transaction, so that markets produce too much of them. The remedy is to make polluters face the full cost of what they do. The goal is not zero pollution but the efficient level of pollution, where the benefit of one more unit of production just equals the damage it causes.
2. Origins
The field has older roots than its name. A. C. Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare (1920) introduced the gap between private and social cost (Topic 9), and Harold Hotelling’s “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources” (1931) founded resource economics. The modern field took shape in the 1960s, when Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) and visible air and water pollution made the environment a political issue. Allen Kneese and Robert Ayres’s “materials balance” approach (1969) pointed out that everything an economy takes from nature eventually returns to it as waste, so pollution is a normal by-product of production, not an exception. William Baumol and Wallace Oates’s The Theory of Environmental Policy (1975) gave the field its standard textbook. The United States passed the Clean Air Act (1970) and created the Environmental Protection Agency the same year, and the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management began publishing in 1974.
3. Three tools
- Taxes. A. C. Pigou (Topic 9) proposed taxing activities whose social cost exceeds their private cost. A tax equal to the marginal damage at the efficient level makes the polluter cut back exactly to that level.
- Property rights and bargaining. Ronald Coase (1960) argued that if property rights are clearly defined and bargaining is cheap, the polluter and the people harmed can reach the efficient outcome by themselves, whoever holds the right. Coase himself stressed that transaction costs are rarely low, which is why the government often has to act.
- Tradable permits. The government caps total emissions and lets firms buy and sell permits, so that cuts are made where they are cheapest. The U.S. acid-rain program of 1990 for sulfur dioxide was the first large example, and the European Union’s carbon market (2005) the largest.
The efficient level of pollution and the Pigouvian tax
The firm’s marginal benefit from emitting falls from $100 for the first ton to $0 at 100 tons; marginal damage to others rises with each ton. Without a tax, the firm emits until its benefit is zero.
4. Resources, valuation, and discounting
Harold Hotelling (1931) showed that the owner of an exhaustible resource such as oil should extract it so that its net price rises at the rate of interest, which makes leaving it in the ground as good an investment as selling it. Environmental economists also developed ways to put money values on things that have no market price, such as clean air or a species, by asking people what they would pay (“contingent valuation”) or by inferring values from house prices and travel costs. These values feed into cost–benefit analysis of regulations.
Climate change raised the stakes. William Nordhaus built the first “integrated assessment models,” which link the economy to the climate, and recommended a carbon tax that starts modest and rises over time; he shared the Nobel Prize in 2018. The Stern Review (2006) called climate change “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen” and recommended much faster action. Most of the difference between them came from one number: the discount rate used to compare damages in the distant future with costs today.
How much is future climate damage worth today?
5. Critics
Critics, including ecological economists, argue that this framework treats nature as substitutable by money, that the discount rate is an ethical choice about future generations disguised as a technical one, and that willingness to pay depends on the ability to pay, which gives the preferences of the rich more weight.
Defenders reply that every policy implies some valuation, so it is better to make the numbers explicit, and that carbon pricing and tradable permits have cut pollution at lower cost than rigid regulation. The disagreement with ecological economics (Topic 23) is less about tools than about goals: efficiency within a growing economy, or limits on the scale of the economy itself.
Readings
Core reading
Robert N. Stavins, “Environmental Economics,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd ed., 2008).
Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960), sections 1–5.
Companion reading
William Nordhaus, The Climate Casino (2013), selected chapters.
Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (2006), summary of conclusions.