Lingyi Wei

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Keynes and the Great Depression

Why a market economy can stay stuck with mass unemployment, and what Keynes thought should be done about it.

In this topic
  1. The Depression and the orthodox answer
  2. Why wage cuts do not restore employment
  3. Effective demand and the multiplier (interactive)
  4. Investment, uncertainty, and animal spirits
  5. Liquidity preference and the limits of monetary policy
  6. Socializing investment, and what came after

1. The Depression and the orthodox answer

After the Wall Street crash of October 1929, the U.S. economy contracted for almost four years. By 1933 real output had fallen by roughly a quarter, consumer prices had fallen by about a quarter, and roughly one worker in four was unemployed. Thousands of banks failed. The collapse spread through trade and finance to Europe and Latin America. Britain left the gold standard in 1931, and the United States began the New Deal in 1933.

The economics of the time, which Keynes called “classical,” had a clear answer. In a competitive economy, unemployment means the price of labor is too high. If money wages fall, firms hire more workers. If saving exceeds investment, the interest rate falls until investment rises to absorb the saving. Say’s law, the idea that supply creates its own demand, ruled out a general shortage of demand.

Orthodox viewUnemployment comes from wages that are too high. Flexible wages and interest rates bring the economy back to full employment. The best policy is to let prices adjust and balance the budget.
KeynesUnemployment comes from too little spending. Falling wages and prices can make things worse. The government should sustain demand, if necessary by borrowing and investing.

2. Why wage cuts do not restore employment

Keynes made two arguments. First, workers and employers bargain over money wages, not real wages. If money wages fall, prices tend to fall too, so the real wage need not fall much at all. Second, and more fundamentally, wages are not only a cost to firms but also the income from which workers buy goods. Cutting wages across the whole economy cuts demand, and firms facing falling sales do not hire more workers. What is sensible for one employer is self-defeating for all employers together: a fallacy of composition.

Falling prices can also raise the real burden of debt. Irving Fisher’s “debt-deflation” theory (1933) showed how deflation forces borrowers to cut spending and sell assets, which pushes prices down further.

3. Effective demand and the multiplier

Keynes argued that output and employment are set by effective demand: what households, firms, and government actually spend. Households spend a fraction of each extra dollar of income, the marginal propensity to consume (c), and save the rest. Investment depends on firms’ expectations about the future, not on how much households save. In the simplest model, output settles where it equals spending:

Y = C + I + G, with C = a + c·Y  ⟹  Y = (a + I + G) / (1 − c)

The term 1 / (1 − c) is the multiplier. An extra dollar of investment or government spending becomes someone’s income, part of which is spent again, and so on.

The multiplier and the paradox of thrift

The paradox of thrift: when households all try to save more, consumption falls, output and incomes fall, and in the end total saving is no higher than before, because saving must still equal investment. What is prudent for one household can impoverish the whole economy.

Try this: press “Everyone tries to save 50 more” and compare total saving before and after. Then lower the marginal propensity to consume. What happens to the multiplier?

4. Investment, uncertainty, and animal spirits

If investment drives demand, what drives investment? In chapter 12 of The General Theory, Keynes argued that firms must estimate returns years into the future on knowledge that is extremely thin. In practice they fall back on convention: they assume the present will continue unless there is a reason to think otherwise. Because conventions are fragile, investment can swing violently on news and moods. Keynes called the urge to act despite uncertainty “animal spirits.”

Stock markets do not fix the problem. Keynes compared professional investing to a newspaper beauty contest in which readers win by picking the faces that other readers will pick. Investors try to anticipate average opinion about average opinion rather than the long-run yield of an asset. He distinguished enterprise, forecasting the yield of assets over their life, from speculation, forecasting the psychology of the market, and warned of the danger when enterprise becomes a bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.

5. Liquidity preference and the limits of monetary policy

In the orthodox story, the interest rate balances saving and investment. Keynes argued instead that it is the price of giving up liquidity: people hold money as a safe asset when they are uncertain, and the interest rate is what persuades them to hold bonds instead. In a deep slump, people may hoard money however low interest rates go, so a central bank cannot push them low enough to revive investment. Later economists called this the liquidity trap; it returned to policy debates in Japan in the 1990s and worldwide after 2008.

6. Socializing investment, and what came after

Keynes was skeptical that monetary policy alone could secure full employment. In chapter 24 he concluded that “a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment” would be needed, by which he meant the state taking responsibility for the overall level of investment, not public ownership of industry. Fiscal policy, public works, and a large role for public investment followed from this.

Two further developments are worth knowing:

After the war, economists such as Hicks and Samuelson absorbed parts of Keynes into a “neoclassical synthesis”: Keynes for the short run, Walras for the long run (Topic 13). Post-Keynesians such as Joan Robinson called this “bastard Keynesianism,” arguing that it dropped uncertainty and the instability of finance, which were the heart of Keynes’s book.

Discussion: Keynes said the problem of the 1930s was not scarcity but the failure to use the resources that existed. Is that a description of a special case, or of how capitalist economies normally work?

Readings

Core reading

Hunt, ch. 15.

Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), ch. 12 and ch. 24.

Companion reading

Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, ch. 9.

Yueh, What Would the Great Economists Do?, ch. 5 (Fisher) and ch. 6 (Keynes).

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