中文Resources › Theories of International Trade › Topic 13
Old Institutionalism and the Advantages of Backwardness
Before 1914, Germany and the United States overtook Britain, the first industrial nation. Institutional economists asked how this was possible. Their answer turned on the borrowing of technology across borders, and on the institutions that allowed some latecomers to borrow successfully while others fell further behind. This topic follows the argument from Thorstein Veblen to Alexander Gerschenkron and Moses Abramovitz.
1. Institutionalism and trade
American institutional economics, which grew out of the German historical school (Topic 10) and the American reform movements of the late nineteenth century, never produced a distinct theory of international trade comparable to Ricardo’s or Heckscher–Ohlin’s. Its founders, Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, and Wesley Mitchell, objected to the whole method of such theories. Markets, they argued, are not natural mechanisms that allocate given resources but evolving institutions: sets of habits, laws, and organizations that change over time. Technology develops cumulatively and spreads across borders. To understand trade and development, one has to study how technology and institutions interact in particular countries and periods. The institutionalists’ contribution to trade theory came through this historical and comparative approach, above all in the study of latecomers.
2. Veblen on Imperial Germany
In Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (1915), written during the First World War, Veblen asked how Germany had become an industrial power within a few decades. His answer was that Germany had borrowed the industrial technology that Britain had developed over a century, without also inheriting the British institutions and habits that had grown up around it.
Britain, Veblen argued, suffered a penalty of taking the lead. Its railways had been built with small wagons and narrow tunnels that later could not be changed without enormous cost; its factories, towns, and business practices had grown up around older techniques; and its business class had acquired the habits of a leisured gentry. Germany could adopt the newest technology at once, on a large scale, without the dead weight of earlier investments and conventions. But Germany combined modern technology with an older, dynastic state that put it to military uses, and Veblen thought the combination unstable and dangerous. He applied a similar argument to Japan.
The idea that the latecomer can skip stages by borrowing the leader’s technology, and that the leader can become locked into outdated arrangements, became a lasting theme in the study of trade, technology, and growth.
3. Commons and the rules of exchange
John R. Commons, at the University of Wisconsin, made the transaction, rather than the commodity, the basic unit of economics. Every exchange, he argued, rests on working rules that define property rights, enforce contracts, and settle disputes, rules made by courts, legislatures, and organizations through collective action. In Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924) and Institutional Economics (1934), he traced how American courts had redefined property and contract as the economy changed. Applied to trade, the point is that markets, national or international, do not exist before the rules that constitute them. Each trade agreement, from the commercial treaties of the nineteenth century to the WTO (Topic 12), is a set of working rules about what may be traded and on what terms. This view anticipates both Polanyi (Topic 14) and new institutional economics (Topic 15), though the latter would develop it with very different tools.
4. Gerschenkron’s advantages of backwardness
Alexander Gerschenkron, an economic historian born in Odessa who taught at Harvard, generalized Veblen’s insight in his essay “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective” (first published in 1952 and reprinted as the title essay of his 1962 book). Comparing Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Russia, he argued that the more backward a country was when it began to industrialize, the more its industrialization differed from Britain’s:
- It came as a sudden great spurt rather than a gradual process, because the gap between what was possible and what existed was larger.
- It emphasized large plants and enterprises, using the latest technology, and producer goods such as iron, steel, and machinery rather than consumer goods.
- It put more pressure on the consumption of the population and relied less on agriculture as a growing market.
- It required special institutions to mobilize capital that the market alone could not provide. In moderately backward Germany, these were the large investment banks; in very backward Russia, where even banks could not raise enough capital, the state itself took the lead.
- It needed a powerful ideology to inspire the effort, such as Saint-Simonianism in France or nationalism in Germany.
Backwardness was therefore an opportunity as well as a handicap. The latecomer could import technology, capital, and skilled workers from abroad. Gerschenkron’s approach was explicitly a criticism of stage theories (Topic 10), which held that every country had to pass through the same stages as Britain. Latecomers did not repeat the leader’s history; they substituted new institutions for the prerequisites they lacked. This idea shaped later analyses of state-led development, including those of the developmental state (Topic 11).
5. Social capability and convergence
If backwardness offers an advantage, why don’t all poor countries catch up? Moses Abramovitz, in “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind” (1986), answered that the potential for rapid growth from borrowing technology is realized only by countries with sufficient social capability: education, technical competence, financial and commercial institutions able to mobilize capital, and political stability. A country that is technologically backward but socially advanced is in a strong position to catch up. One that is backward in both is not. Abramovitz also noted that technology developed in the leading country is suited to its conditions, such as its large markets and abundant capital, and may fit followers poorly. Economists later called this conditional convergence: poor countries tend to grow faster than rich ones only once their institutions and human capital are accounted for.
Catching up, forging ahead, falling behind
The leader’s income grows 2% a year. A follower starts at one-fifth of the leader’s income. Its growth has two parts: a base rate, and a catch-up bonus proportional to the technology gap that it can borrow from, scaled by its social capability. Without social capability, the gap is just a gap.
6. Readings
Core reading
Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (1915), selections.
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962), chapter 1.
Companion reading
E. K. Hunt and Mark Lautzenheiser, History of Economic Thought, 3rd ed. (2011), chapter 12.
Moses Abramovitz, “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind,” Journal of Economic History (1986).