中文Resources › Theories of International Trade › Topic 12
Neo-Developmentalism: Kicking Away the Ladder
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Washington Consensus urged developing countries to liberalize trade, and the new World Trade Organization wrote many of those prescriptions into binding rules. A new generation of development economists replied that today’s rich countries had followed very different policies when they were developing. This topic covers their historical argument, the debate over how far a country should depart from its comparative advantage, and the recent return of industrial policy in rich countries themselves.
1. The WTO and policy space
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986–94) created the World Trade Organization in 1995. Unlike the GATT, which had dealt mainly with tariffs on goods, the WTO’s agreements reached deep into domestic policy:
- The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures prohibited subsidies conditional on exporting or on using domestic rather than imported inputs, the kind of export subsidies South Korea had used (Topic 11). The least developed countries received exemptions or transition periods.
- The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prohibited requirements that foreign investors use a certain share of local inputs or balance their imports with exports.
- The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) required all members to enforce patents and copyrights at standards close to those of rich countries, raising the cost of copying foreign technology.
Robert Wade (2003) argued that these rules were “shrinking the development space,” the room for policies that developing countries could use to build new industries. Bilateral and regional trade agreements often went further. Defenders replied that the rules still allowed tariffs within agreed limits, subsidies for research and regional development, and many other forms of support, and that they protected developing countries from the far larger subsidies of the rich.
2. Kicking away the ladder
Ha-Joon Chang’s Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (2002) took its title from Friedrich List (Topic 9). Chang surveyed the economic history of Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Sweden, Japan, and others, and argued that almost all of today’s rich countries used tariffs, subsidies, and other forms of industrial promotion when they were catching up:
- Britain protected its woolen industry from the fifteenth century and, under Robert Walpole’s reforms of 1721, adopted a comprehensive program of tariffs, export subsidies, and duty drawbacks to promote manufactures. It turned to free trade only in the 1840s, once its industrial lead was secure.
- The United States, which Chang called “the mother country and bastion of modern protectionism,” had among the highest tariffs on manufactures in the world from the 1820s until after the Second World War.
- Germany, Japan, and the East Asian economies combined protection with active state support for industry and technology.
Chang also examined institutions. Rich countries had adopted democracy, independent central banks, modern patent laws, and limits on child labor only gradually and late in their development. Asking poor countries to adopt “global standard” policies and institutions at once, he argued, was asking them to climb a ladder the rich had kicked away. Critics, including Douglas Irwin, questioned whether protection had caused growth in these cases or merely accompanied it.
3. Reinert and the Other Canon
Erik Reinert’s How Rich Countries Got Rich … and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (2007) drew a sharp line between two traditions. The standard canon, from Smith and Ricardo to neoclassical economics, treats all economic activities as qualitatively alike and focuses on exchange. The “Other Canon,” running from Antonio Serra and the mercantilists through List and the historical school (Topic 10) to Schumpeter, focuses on production, learning, and innovation. It holds that economic activities differ in quality. Manufacturing and other activities with increasing returns, rapid technical progress, and imperfect competition generate rising wages and spread knowledge; raw-material production subject to diminishing returns does not. A country that specializes by comparative advantage in low-quality activities may specialize in being poor. Reinert pointed to Serra’s observation in 1613 that Venice, with no natural resources but many crafts, was rich, while resource-rich Naples was poor.
4. Lin’s new structural economics
Justin Yifu Lin, chief economist of the World Bank from 2008 to 2012, proposed what he called new structural economics. Lin agreed that the state has a central role in development, but argued that it should help a country exploit its comparative advantage, not defy it. A country’s comparative advantage is determined by its endowments of labor, capital, and natural resources, which change as the economy grows. A poor, labor-abundant country should begin with labor-intensive industries and move up step by step as it accumulates capital.
The state’s task is to facilitate: to identify industries consistent with the country’s latent comparative advantage, for instance by looking at industries that have succeeded in dynamically growing countries with somewhat higher incomes and similar endowments, and then to remove the constraints on those industries by providing infrastructure, special economic zones, and help for pioneering firms. Lin argued that import substitution in Latin America and the Soviet Union failed because it pushed capital-intensive heavy industry far beyond what endowments could support, while China after 1978 succeeded once it moved toward labor-intensive exports.
5. The Lin–Chang debate
In 2009, Lin and Chang debated in the journal Development Policy Review under the title “Should Industrial Policy in Developing Countries Conform to Comparative Advantage or Defy It?” Choose a question to compare their positions.
Follow or defy comparative advantage?
6. The return of industrial policy
For decades after 1980, “industrial policy” was widely treated as a discredited idea. Since the 2008 financial crisis, and especially since the late 2010s, it has returned, now in the rich countries. China’s “Made in China 2025” plan (2015) set targets for advanced industries. The United States passed the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022, with large subsidies for semiconductors and clean energy, some tied to domestic production. The European Union and Japan responded with their own programs. The motives include national security, resilient supply chains, competition with China, and the energy transition, rather than catching up.
Research on the subject has also revived. Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane, and Dani Rodrik (2024) surveyed a new generation of studies that use better data and methods. Some find that targeted industrial policies had lasting effects, for example Nathan Lane’s study of South Korea’s Heavy and Chemical Industry drive. The debate is no longer only about whether developing countries may use such policies, but about which rules should govern a world in which every major economy uses them.
7. Readings
Core reading
Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (2002), chapter 2.
Justin Yifu Lin and Ha-Joon Chang, “Should Industrial Policy in Developing Countries Conform to Comparative Advantage or Defy It? A Debate between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang,” Development Policy Review (2009).
Companion reading
Erik Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich … and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (2007), chapter 1.
Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane, and Dani Rodrik, “The New Economics of Industrial Policy,” Annual Review of Economics (2024).