Lingyi Wei

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Ricardo and Comparative Advantage

Smith showed that two countries gain when each is better at something. David Ricardo showed something far less obvious: trade benefits both countries even when one of them is more productive in every good. This topic works through his argument, its assumptions, and its place in the campaign that ended Britain’s Corn Laws.

In this topic
  1. The Corn Laws and the discovery
  2. The four numbers
  3. Comparative advantage as opportunity cost
  4. Production possibilities and the terms of trade (interactive)
  5. Assumptions
  6. From theory to policy
  7. Readings

1. The Corn Laws and the discovery

During the Napoleonic Wars, blockades cut Britain off from European grain, and domestic grain prices and rents soared. When peace came in 1815, Parliament passed a Corn Law that barred imports of wheat until the domestic price reached 80 shillings a quarter, protecting the landlords who dominated Parliament. Ricardo, a wealthy stockbroker turned economist and later a member of Parliament, opposed the law. In his theory of rent, cheap imported grain would lower the cost of feeding workers, reduce rents, and raise profits and accumulation (see the History of Economic Thought course, Topic 4).

The principle of comparative advantage appeared almost at once in several places. Robert Torrens stated it in An Essay on the External Corn Trade (1815). James Mill helped develop it, and Ricardo set it out most fully in chapter 7, “On Foreign Trade,” of On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). Historians still debate who deserves the credit, but the version that entered economics is Ricardo’s.

2. The four numbers

Ricardo’s example uses two countries, England and Portugal, and two goods, cloth and wine. The numbers show how many workers it takes, for a year, to produce a given quantity of each:

ClothWine
England100 workers120 workers
Portugal90 workers80 workers

Portugal needs fewer workers for both goods. It has an absolute advantage in both, so Smith’s principle (Topic 2) would seem to say that Portugal should make both. Ricardo showed otherwise. If England specializes in cloth and Portugal in wine, England can get the wine it used to make with 120 workers by exporting cloth made by 100 workers. Portugal can get the cloth it used to make with 90 workers by exporting wine made by 80. Both save labor. As Ricardo put it, Portugal may find it more advantageous to employ its capital in producing wine, “even though she could make the cloth with less labour than England.”

3. Comparative advantage as opportunity cost

What matters is not absolute productivity but relative cost. In England, making one unit of cloth means giving up 100/120 = 0.83 units of wine. In Portugal it means giving up 90/80 = 1.125 units of wine. Cloth is relatively cheap in England, and wine relatively cheap in Portugal. A country has a comparative advantage in the good it produces at a lower opportunity cost than its trading partner. As long as the ratios differ, both countries can gain from trade, whatever their absolute levels of productivity.

The gains depend on the terms of trade, the rate at which cloth exchanges for wine. Both countries gain if one unit of cloth trades for between 0.83 and 1.125 units of wine. At 0.83, England gains nothing, since it could make that wine itself at the same cost; at 1.125, Portugal gains nothing. Ricardo did not explain where within this range the price would settle. That question was answered by John Stuart Mill (Topic 4).

Production possibilities and the terms of trade

England has 220 workers and Portugal 170, enough for each to make one unit of each good without trade, as in Ricardo’s example. Change the labor needed per unit and the terms of trade. The solid line is each country’s production possibility frontier; the dashed line shows what it can consume by specializing and trading.

4. Assumptions

Ricardo’s result is a logical truth given its assumptions, and much of the later history of trade theory consists of relaxing them one at a time:

The economist Paul Samuelson, asked to name a proposition in the social sciences that is both true and non-trivial, chose comparative advantage. It is true, he explained, as a matter of logic, and not trivial, as shown by the many intelligent people who have never grasped it or believed it.

5. From theory to policy

Comparative advantage became the intellectual foundation of the free-trade movement. The Anti-Corn Law League, founded in Manchester in 1838 and led by Richard Cobden and John Bright, campaigned for cheap bread and open markets with mass meetings, pamphlets, and petitions. The Irish famine of 1845–46 forced the issue, and Prime Minister Robert Peel repealed the Corn Laws in 1846, splitting his Conservative Party. Over the next decades Britain removed nearly all its tariffs and repealed the Navigation Acts (1849). The Cobden–Chevalier treaty with France (1860) began a wave of tariff-cutting treaties across Europe that lasted until the late 1870s.

Question to think about: Comparative advantage assumes that capital cannot move between countries. What happens to the argument when it can?

6. Readings

Core reading

David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), chapter 7.

Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide (1996), chapter 6.

Companion reading

E. K. Hunt and Mark Lautzenheiser, History of Economic Thought, 3rd ed. (2011), chapter 5.

Linda Yueh, What Would the Great Economists Do? (2018), chapter 2.

Roy Ruffin, “David Ricardo’s Discovery of Comparative Advantage,” History of Political Economy (2002).

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